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I 
Aristotle presents the reader of his Nicomachean 
Ethics with many passages worthy of curiosity. One 
passage of this curious sort also happens to be of 
interest to those who love animals. This passage 
asserts, among other things, that a horse has virtue. 
What I wish to do is to ask whether we can take 
Aristotle's assertion seriously. We shall see that we 
can indeed. This passage will provide us not only with 
a new perspective on the classical conception of virtue 
but also with a new insight into the admirable virtue 
of our equine companions. This new insight in its 
tum suggests that animal ethics might find a new basis 
in what we today term virtue ethics. 
II 
We probably ought to begin with a look at the 
passage in question. The passage is part of an argument 
proving that moral virtue is a habit which lies on a mean. 
Artistotle begins the argument with the general 
proposition that all virtue brings that which possess it 
into good condition and makes its function good (NE. 
2.6., l106aIS-17). From this proposition he draws the 
corollary that human virtue is a habit which makes us 
good and makes us perform our function well 
(1106a21-24). 
To prove the general proposition, Aristotle makes 
the assertion which has piqued our curiosity: 
Similarly the virtue of a horse makes the horse 
both good and good at running and at carrying 
its rider and at awaiting the enemy (NE. 2.6., 
l106a19-21).1 
Actually this sentence asserts merely that the virtue of 
a horse makes a horse good, and that its virtue makes 
its function good. But the sentence clearly implies that 
a horse has virtue.2 
Now the implication that a horse has virtue seems 
absurd on Aristotle's own account of virtue. On his 
account only human beings appear to have the 
rationality necessary for the acquisition of virtue. 
Aristotle argues that human rationality has two parts. 
The one part is theoretical, and the other part practical 
(NE. 6. 1., 1139a6-11). Though the theoretical part 
cannot, the practical part can create virtue. The 
theoretical part only grasps truth, but the practical part 
both grasps truth and controls desire. Aristotle explicitly 
argues only that the practical part grasps truth and agrees 
with desire: 
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Of the intellect which is theoretical, neither 
practical nor productive, the functions which 
are good and bad are truth and falsity, for these 
are the functions of all intellectual faculties. 
Of the intellect which is practical, the good 
function is truth in agreement with right desire 
(NE. 6. 2., 1139a27-31). 
But he also implies that the practical intellect agrees 
with right desire because it makes desire right: 
The appetitive part in a strong-willed man 
obeys a principle. And in the temperate and 
courageous man it is even more obedient. For 
on all matters it speaks with the same voice as 
a principle. (NE. I. 13., 1102b26-28). 
The practical part would appear to command desire, 
for desire obeys its principle in those who are virtuous 
or strong-willed. 
Indeed our practical intellect so informs desire with 
its principle that it makes desire more rational: 
And if it is necessary to say that the irrational 
part has a principle, the part having a principle 
will be twofold. The one part has a principle 
in the chief sense and in itself, and the other 
part has a principle as listening to it as if to its 
parent (NE. 1. 13., l103al-3).  
The rational part having a principle in the chief sense 
would be our rationality, and the rational part having 
a principle in the sense of listening to one would be 
our desire. 
Aristotle also reminds us that our practical 
rationality itself divides into two parts. The one part 
concerns the ends of our action, and the other concerns 
the means to our ends. The part concerned with our 
ends is practical intuition. Aristotle is not completely 
explicit about what function practical intuition has. 
But he does appear to assert that intuition of this kind 
concerns practical facts which are principles of action: 
The first principles of that for the sake of 
which are the ultimate facts themselves, for 
from the particulars arise the universals. Of 
these, we must therefore have apperception, 
and this apperception is intuition (NE. 6. 11., 
1143b4-5). 
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He asserts in effect that practical intuition grasps the 
ultimate facts and that the ultimate facts include the 
principles for the sake of which we act. These principles 
are universals which arise from particulars.3 
He is quite explicit about the part concerned with 
means. He clearly asserts that deliberation concerns 
the means to our ends (NE. 3. 3., 1112b32-34). And he 
uses examples from the professions to show that we 
assume our ends and'deliberate about our means (NE. 
3.3., 1112bl1-16). 
And Aristotle argues that when we use our rationality 
to act, we are also able to develop habits which 
correspond to our actions: 
In a word habits thus arise out of similar 
activities. That is why it is necessary to exhibit 
activities of a certain kind. For habits 
correspond to differences among these 
activities (NE. 2. 1., lI03b21-23). 
Of course the actions to be performed ought not to be 
excessive or deficient. They can only be in accordance 
with a mean (NE. 2. 2., 1104a20-27 and NE. 2. 6., 
1106a24-1106b7). 
We thus see that we must have a practical rationality 
with practical intuition and deliberation in order to 
develop moral virtue. But rationality of this sort is the 
very property which distinguishes us from other 
animals. Aristotle makes this fact clear when he defines 
the human function: 
What can the human function be? Life appears 
to be common to plants. But we seek what is 
peculiar to human beings. The life of nutrition 
and growth must therefore be excluded. A life 
of perception follows. But this life appears to 
be common to a horse and an ox and all 
animals. A practical life of the part having a 
principle then remains (NE. 1.7., 1097b33-
11098a4). 
Please notice that he explicitly cites the horse as an 
example of an animal which does not have a rational 
life. A horse has only a life ofperception and nutrition. 
A horse would consequently appear to have only 
what Aristotle calls virtue in the natural sense. He 
argues that the presence of practical rationality is what 
distinguishes virtue in the full sense from virtue in the 
natural sense: 
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If a man acquires practical intuition, there is a 
difference in his action. His habit will be 
similar to natural virtue, but it will be virtue 
in the chief sense (NE. 6. 13., 1144bI2-14). 
Virtue in the natural sense is only a natural ethical quality: 
All people think that each of the ethical 
characteristics belongs somehow by nature to 
those who have them. For we are just and 
temperate and courageous from the moment 
of birth (N£. 6. 13., 1144b4-6). 
Virtue of this sort especially exists in children and in 
other animals (N£. 6. 13., 1144b8-9). In a word, it is 
an instinct. 
III 
But if we take another look at the passage in 
question, we can see that the equine virtue under 
discussion cannot be virtue in the natural sense. For 
this virtue not only makes a horse good, it also makes a 
horse good at performing its function. But the functions 
.mentioned do not appear to be functions entirely natural 
to a horse. Though it can perform them, a horse does 
not perform these functions on its own. One surely 
would not think that a horse naturally carries another 
animal on its back, let alone does so well. Nor would 
one be apt to think that a horse quietly awaits its enemy. 
One might think that a horse naturally runs well. But 
we shall see that it in fact does not. 
Aristotle would thus appear to write of some 
conception of virtue other than virtue in the strict sense 
or in the natural sense. He appears to discuss a 
conception of what I shall call a hybrid virtue. What is 
a hybrid virtue? A virtue of this sort appears to be a 
cross between human virtue in the strict sense and 
animal virtue in the natural sense. This virtue is partially 
human and partially animal. 
But how does a hybrid virtue arise? We have seen 
that our practical rationality enables us to grasp a 
practical principle and to control our instincts. And 
with this understanding and control we can develop 
virtue and improve our function. What we shall now 
see is that our practical rationality also enables us to 
develop virtue in other animals and to improve their 
function. We can use our rationality to understand an 
animal and to control its instincts through rewards and 
punishments. We can thus develop hybrid virtues in an 
animal by training it And we may do so even though 
an animal does not itself have a rationality enabling it 
to develop its own virtue and improve its function. If it 
does have rationality, a horse at least does not appear 
to have a practical rationality sufficient to develop 
virtues for the functions under consideration.4 
.(We need not turn far afield for a confmnation of 
our conjecture about horses and their virtue. 
Xenophon wrote a treatise on equitation. And though 
it is the earliest work extant, his treatise is still 
recognized today as authoritative on matters treated 
by him.s But more importantly his work illustrates 
how we can instill practical principles in a horse and 
develop virtues in it. These principles, Xenophon 
himself asserts, will enable a horse to perform better 
those functions for which it has a capacity (On 
Equitation 3. 7-8.). 
Because he was concerned with cavalry horses, 
Xenophon considers the functions of running and 
carrying a rider together. And he accordingly concerns 
himself with how to train a horse for the end of 
performing military maneuvers. He finds the means 
for performing these maneuvers in an enhanced 
capacity for running and turning. He consequently 
recommends the volte, which is a turning exercise, 
and the ellipse, which apparently combines running 
and turning: 
We recommend the exercise called the volle 
because it accustoms a horse to turn on both 
jaws. To change the direction of the exercise 
is also good in order that both jaws may be 
balanced by each change of exercise. But we . 
recommend the ellipse rather than the circle, 
for a horse will tum more gladly, having had 
its fill of the stretch. And it will thus practice 
straight running and turning at the same time 
CEQ. 7. 13-14.).6 
He also argues that a horse ought to be trained to stop 
and to start all ofa sudden (EQ 7. 18.), to be able to run 
up, down, and across hills, and to leap up and down 
banks and across ditches (EQ. 8. 1.). 
When he explains how to turn, he makes explicit 
the military principle behind these exercises: 
Whenever the horse faces the stretch after 
finishing a tum, at that very instant urge it on 
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at a fast speed. For it is clear that in war turns 
are for the sake of attacking or retreating. To 
practice running at the fastest speed after making 
a tum is therefore a good exercise (EQ. 7. 17.). 
To perform sudden stops and starts would also be 
useful for attack and retreat (see again EQ. 7. 18.). 
And presumably so would the ability to negotiate 
uneven terrain. 
Xenophon is not all work and no play, however. 
He does present some recommendations for dressage 
functions, which for him serve in parades. He even 
appears to explain how to train a horse for the pasade: 
Now when a horse plants its hind legs under 
it, if you pull it back with the bit. it will bend 
its hind legs at the hocks and raise its front 
quarters so that those who are in front can see 
its belly and sheath. When it does this, it is 
necessary to give it the bit so that it will seem 
to those who look on that it performs allan its 
own the prettiest feat of a horse (EQ. II. 3.). 
And for both campaigns and parades Xenophon also 
discusses qualities desirable in the movement ofa horse. 
He especially recommends collection. This quality 
refers to gathering the legs of a horse under it. He argues 
that it increases stability in turns: 
It is necessary to collect a horse in the turns 
because it is neither easy nor safe for it to make 
short turns at full speed, especially if the 
ground is hard or slippery. When he collects 
it, the rider must with the bit allow the horse 
to lean as little as possible, and he must lean 
as little as possible himself. If not, he must 
surely know that trivial things will be sufficient 
to cause both himself and the horse to fall flat 
(EQ. 7. 15-16.). 
He also recommends collecting a horse when leaping 
over ditches (EQ. 8. 5.). 
By taking it through its paces, a human being can 
thus develop virtue in a horse and enable it to perform 
better the functions of running and of carrying a rider. 
Oddly enough, Xenophon says very little about training 
a horse to await the enemy. But he does recommend 
that a horse be trained to overcome its shyness of any 
object which might be fearful to it (EQ. 6. 14-15), and 
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that a colt be accustomed to crowds and to sights and 
sounds of all sorts (EQ. 2. 5.). 
To supplement what Xenophon has written, we 
might briefly consider a modem treatise on equitation. 
Harry Boldt has written a treatise on dressage functions 
which serve for equestrian competition.? And he too 
discusses qualities of the movement of a horse. The 
quality most significant for us is straightness. This 
quality especially indicates why a horse can run better 
after being trained. A horse naturally has a quality called 
crookedness, which resembles handedness in a human 
being. It causes a horse to favor one side: 
The horse is however naturally crooked. The 
hind feet do not track into the hoofprints of 
the corresponding front feet. As a rule horses 
are crooked from their right hind quarter in 
the direction of the left front quarter. That is 
to say, the left hind foot will tread in between 
the hoofprints of the forelegs and the right hind 
foot will tread outside of the right foreleg. The 
right hind foot will therefore be placed not 
under the belly of the horse but alongside of 
the horse (Boldt, ch. 3, p. 114).8 
When straightened with exercises, a horse can run better 
and carry a rider better. For it has improved pushing 
and carrying ability, and it has greater flexibility and is 
more relaxed (Boldt, ch. 3, pp. 114-115).9 
We see then that we can use our rationality and its 
principles to develop virtues in a horse and to improve its 
functions. And we may of course use other principles 
besides those of cavalry and dressage. These other 
principles would include the principles of working, 
hunting, racing, jumping, driving, playing games, and 
simply riding. 1O 
IV 
Perhaps we ought now to consider some objections 
which someone might raise against our conception of 
a hybrid virtue. One might ask how an equine virtue 
in our hybrid sense could be more than a natural virtue. 
Aristotle himself argues that only by its presence does 
practical rationality distinguish virtue in the strict sense 
from virtue in the natural sense (see again NE. 6. 13., 
1144bI2-14). But we seem to admit that practical 
rationality is not present in a hybrid virtue. We use 
our own rationali ty to create moral virtue in an animal 
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which appears to have no rational part. And our 
rationality obviously cannot be present in an animal 
of such sort. 
Our answer to this objection would be that 
practical rationality is obviously present in the 
rational part of whoever rides a horse. We use our 
rationality not only to train a horse but also to guide 
a horse after it has been trained. Xenophon himself 
implies that we must use our rationality to ride a horse 
when he tells us of the one great precept of equitation. 
This precept is never to approach a horse in a fit of 
anger (EQ. 6. 13.) And Boldt emphasizes that we 
must have concentration when we ride. Only good 
concentration enables a horse to maintain its 
composure (Boldt, ch. 3, p. 118). 
We can also see that our rationality is present in 
the irrational part of the horse too. For we have instilled 
the practical principles of equitation in the habits of 
the horse. Indeed Boldt argues that a rider can best 
develop concentration and inner calm on a trained 
horse (Boldt, ch. 3, p. 118). 
We would however note that practical rationality 
of a sort lesser than human rationality does appear to 
be present in horses, and that a horse can sometimes 
use this limited rationality to exercise a hybrid virtue 
and perform its function. Stock horses offer a 
conspicuous example of this facL. A cutting horse 
apparently learns almost by itself how to cut a cow 
from a herd. The rider has to guide the horse initially 
to give it an idea of what it is to do. But after a few 
sessions the rider need only ride, and the horse will 
"work on its own." The horse will also gradually 
improve its ability to perform this task (Williamson, 
pp. 94-96).11 
One might also object that moral virtue by definition 
requires a mean (see (NE. 2. 2., II04a20-27 andNE. 2. 
6., II 06a24-1106b7), and we have discussed no mean 
with regard to training horses. Though we did not 
discuss it, equine virtue does however lie on a mean. 
Xenophon argues that a horse ought not to be forced to 
run too far for its strength. He does so on the grounds 
that nothing excessive is pleasant for horses or for 
humans (EQ. 10. 14.). Boldt also argues that one ought 
not to overexercise a horse. And that every week it 
ought to have one or twO days of light work and one 
day off (Boldt, ch. 3, p. 170). 
Finally, one might object that our hybrid virtue does 
not rest on any natural function. For all virtues arise 
out of some instinct (See again NE. 6.13., 1144b12-14 
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andalsoNE. 2.5., 1l05b25-28). But equine virtue does 
rest on a natural function. Xenophon calls this function 
a willingness and ability to work (EQ. 3. 12.). Boldt 
calls it a readiness and eagerness to work (Boldt, ch. 3, 
pp. 70-71). The function is simply the desire of the 
horse to run. 
v 
We see then that a horse may have virtue. A horse 
may not be able to have virtue in the strict sense, but it 
is able to have more than virtue in the natural sense. 
What we call a hybrid virtue is a virtue resulting from 
our ability to use our rationality to develop good habits 
in a horse and to improve its function. 
And so we have a new perspective on the classical 
conception of virtue. The classical conception of moral 
virtue is applicable not only to human beings but also 
to other animals. At least to domesticated animals. 
Because we can use our rationality to create habits in 
them, we can also use this conception of moral virtue 
to analyze the habits created in these animals. 
We thus appear to have discovered a new basis for 
the ethical treatment of domesticated animals. 
Because it possesses hybrid virtue, a horse would 
appear to be a member of our moral community. And 
as we ought to respect the virtue and function of 
another human being, so we ought to respect the virtue 
and function of a horse. Indeed we have a double 
obligation to respect equine virtue. Not only does 
virtue of this sort resemble strict virtue, but this virtue 
is also a virtue created by us,u 
And we now find that several avenues of inquiry 
present themselves for further consideration. Another 
subject for inquiry would obviously be hybrid vice. To 
train an animal to act in an extreme fashion would 
clearly be to create a vice in it. And to train an animal 
to perform some functions might also make it vicious 
(see NE. 2. 6., lI07a8-27). Those who are pacifists 
would question the morality of training horses for 
military service, for example. 
We have also restricted our inquiry only to horses, 
but we do domesticate other species, most notably dogs. 
And so we might ask what virtue we instill in these 
animals. For example, canine virtue would appear to 
be a hybrid virtue. 
Finally we might ask about breeding animals for 
these functions. Are there virtuous and vicious breeds 
of horses? Or virtuous and vicious breeds of dogs? 
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Notes 
I My translations of Aristotle. 
2The commentators have very little to say aboutAristotle's 
reference to the virtue of a horse. Grant merely refers us to 
Republic 1., where Plato presents arguments somewhat 
similar. See Alexander Grant, The Ethics ofAristotle, 1885 
ed., (New York: Arno Press, 1973), vol. 1, p. 498. Stewart 
refers us to Grant. See J. A. Stewart, Notes on the 
Nicomachean Ethics, 2 vols., (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1892), vol. 1, p. 192. Dirlmeier suggests that when he here 
refers to virtue, Aristotle does not mean a perfect condition 
but only a preliminary condition, which leads to perfection. 
See Aristoteles, Nikomachische Ethik, trans. and comm. 
Franz Dirlmeier, 1956 ed., (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1983), 
pp. 309-310. Jolif argues simply that Aristotle uses the term 
virtue not in a precise technical sense but in an imprecise 
everyday sense. See Rene Antoine Gauthier and Jean Yves 
Jolif, L' ethique aNicomaque, 2nd ed., 2 vols., (Paris: 
Beatrice-Nauwelaerts, 1970), vol. 2, pt. 1, pp. 135-136. 
3 Contemporary philosophers especially disagree about 
how to interpret Aristotle's conception of practical intuition. 
For a discussion of alternative interpretations, see Norman 
Dahl, Practical Reason, Aristotle, and Weakness of the Will 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984), esp. 
app.l. 
4ln this essay I shall not address the question of whether 
horses might have a practical rationality which is less than 
human rationality but which nonetheless enables them to 
develop good habits of their own. 
5 Podhajsky for example speaks very favorably of 
Xenophon. He also observes that modern equitation began 
in the renaissance with Federico Grisone, who read Xenophon 
thoroughly. See Alois Podhajsky, The Complete Training of 
Horse and Rider, trans. Eva Podhajsky and V.D.S. Williams, 
(New York: Doubleday and Co., 1967), esp. ch. 1, pp. 14-15. 
6 My revisions of the translations by Morgan and 
Marchant. See Xenophon, The Art ofHorsemanship, trans. 
Morris H. Morgan, (London: 1. A. Allen and Co., 1962); and 
Xenophon, On the Art ofHorsemanship, trans. E. C. Marchant, 
Scripta Minora. trans. E. C. Marchant and G. W. Bowersock. 
Loeb Classical Library, 7 vols., (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1968), vol. 7, pp. 295-363. 
7 Harry Boldt, Das Dressurpferd, ch. 3 trans. Sabine 
Schmidt and Dane Rawlins, (Lage-Lippe: Edition 
Haberbeck.1978). 
8 My amendation of the translation by Schmidt and 
Rawlins. 
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9 Podhajsky asserts that most horses are naturally straight, 
and that the weight of the rider makes them crooked. See 
Podhajsky, ch. I, pp. 45-46. But I suspect that the Lippizzaners 
are simply horses of a superior breed. 
10 For an overview of our relationships with horses, one 
might consult the Dossenbachs. See Monique and Hans D. 
Dossenbach, The Noble Horse, trans. Margaret Whale Sutton 
and ed. Margaret Forde, (Boston: G. K. Hall and Co., 1983). 
11 Charles O. Williamson, Breaking and Training the Stock 
Horse, 6th ed., (Caldwell, Idaho: Caxton Printers, Ltd., 1971). 
12 Rollin advocates a teleological ethics for animals. But 
he advocates a teleological ethics based primarily, if not 
exclusively, on biological functions. And these functions 
Aristotle would call natural virtue. Rollin thus appears not to 
take into account any role our rationality might play in 
modifying these functions. See Bernard E. Rollin, Animal 
Rights and Human Morality (Buffalo: Prometheus Books, 
1981). pt. 1. 
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